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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on personal jurisdiction is 
often characterized as confusing1: awash with conflicting justifications, 
labyrinthine plurality opinions,2 and plain incoherence.3 But, amidst 
this sea of uncertainty, the Supreme Court’s rulings in one area of 
personal jurisdiction doctrine, that of general personal jurisdiction, 
have been remarkably consistent. Put simply, a tribunal has general 
personal jurisdiction over a defendant who is “essentially at home” in 
the forum state.4 This doctrinal brevity in general personal 
jurisdiction, however, belies the difficulties facing lower federal courts 
in trying to decide what “essentially at home” means. 
The tangled webs of corporate and commercial relationships 
typifying modern international commerce exacerbate the difficulty of 
the “essentially at home” inquiry. In DaimlerChrysler v. Bauman,5 the 
Court will address these difficulties by answering two questions. First, 
can a multinational corporation that does millions of dollars worth of 
business in a forum state by means of a wholly owned subsidiary be 
properly “at home” in that state? And if so, does this exercise of 
 
∗ J.D. Candidate, 2015, Duke University School of Law. 
         1.  See Robin J. Effron, Letting the Perfect Become the Enemy of the Good: The 
Relatedness Problem in Personal Jurisdiction, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 867, 869 (2012) 
(recognizing that the Supreme Court has not provided a complete and clear legal and political 
theory regarding the exercise of personal jurisdiction). 
 2.  E.g., J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011); Asahi Metal Indus. 
Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
 3.  A. Benjamin Spencer, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Revised Analysis, 73 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 617, 618 (2006). 
 4.  Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011). 
 5.  DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bauman, No. 11-965 (U.S. argued Oct. 15, 2013). 
NOELLE 12.5.2013 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/5/2013  5:14 PM 
18 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR [VOL. 9 
jurisdiction accord with the “traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice” required by the Fourteenth Amendment?6 The 
Court’s resolution of these questions will have profound implications 
for any corporation seeking to do business in the United States. 
II. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
During Argentina’s so-called “Dirty War” from 1976 to 1983, 
German car manufacturer DaimlerChrysler AG’s (DaimlerChrysler)7 
predecessor in interest owned a subsidiary, Mercedes-Benz Argentina, 
which operated a plant in Gonzales-Catan, Argentina.8 Plaintiffs, 
former employees and relatives of employees at the plant, allege that 
Mercedes-Benz Argentina collaborated with Argentina’s ruling 
military junta to commit human rights violations against them and 
their family members.9 
According to Plaintiffs, Mercedes-Benz Argentina labeled certain 
workers as “subversives” and “agitators” and passed those workers’ 
names to state security forces.10 Those security forces kidnaped, 
punished, tortured, and killed the labeled workers.11 Further, 
Mercedes-Benz Argentina allowed Argentine military and state 
police forces inside the plant for periodic raids. Mercedes-Benz 
Argentina also hired an officer of the state police—who had 
organized many of the raids within the Gonzales-Catan plant—as a 
security chief and paid for his representation in later Argentinian 
lawsuits concerning these events.12 
In 2004, twenty-two of these plaintiffs sued DaimlerChrysler, 
among other defendants, in the Northern District of California under 
the Alien Torts Act and the Torture Victim Protection Act for the 
alleged human rights violations arising from Mercedes-Benz 
Argentina’s collaboration with the military junta.13 
 
 
 6.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. 
 7.  Though the named defendant below and petitioner before the Supreme Court is 
“DaimlerChrysler AG” (AG stands for “Aktiengesellschaft,” a designation for a German public 
stock company), it has since changed its name to “Daimler AG.” Brief for Petitioner at ii, 
DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bauman, No. 11-965 (U.S. June 27, 2013), 2013 WL 3362080. 
 8.  Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 644 F.3d 909, 912 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. granted sub 
nom. DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bauman, 133 S. Ct. 1995 (Apr. 22, 2013). 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. 
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DaimlerChrysler is a German stock company headquartered in 
Stuttgart, Germany.14 Following a merger in 1998, the American 
Chrysler Corporation became one of DaimlerChrysler’s wholly 
owned subsidiaries.15 At the time of litigation, DaimlerChrysler had 
no offices or persistent operations in California. DaimlerChrysler’s 
activities and contacts in California consisted of maintaining counsel 
in San Francisco and initiating lawsuits in California to challenge that 
state’s clean air laws and to protect other various business interests.16 
However, DaimlerChrysler manufactured product designs specifically 
for the California market,17 was listed on the Pacific Stock exchange in 
San Francisco,18 and was a corporate partner with the California-
based Global Nature Fund.19 
Rather than manufacture, market, and sell cars in California 
directly, DaimlerChrysler conducted its business operations in 
California, and the United States generally, through a series of 
corporate subsidiaries and holding companies. To wit, 
DaimlerChrysler wholly owned the DaimlerChrysler North American 
Holding Company, which in turn wholly owned Mercedes-Benz USA 
LLC. 20 Mercedes-Benz USA purchased luxury cars manufactured by 
DaimlerChrysler and sold them in the United States.21 Unlike its 
parent, Mercedes-Benz USA had extensive, permanent contacts in 
California, including a regional office in Costa Mesa, a Vehicle 
Preparation Center in Carson, and a Classic Center in Irving.22 
 
 14.  Id. at 913. 
 15.  Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler AG, No. C-04-00194 RMW, 2005 WL 3157472, at *1 
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2005). 
 16.  DaimlerChrysler, 644 F.3d at 917. 
 17.  DaimlerChrysler, 2005 WL 3157472, at *7–8. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. at *8. 
       20.    DaimlerChrysler, 644 F.3d at 913. 
 21.  Id. The relationship between DaimlerChrysler and Mercedes-Benz USA is laid out in 
a “General Distributor Agreement.” Id. at 914–17. In short, the agreement states that 
Mercedes-Benz USA and DaimlerChrysler are to agree each year on sales figures and goals. It 
further allows DaimlerChrysler to oversee Mercedes-Benz USA’s network of resellers, many of 
its systems such as accounting and control, and dealership standards. The agreement also 
requires Mercedes-Benz USA to abide by DaimlerChrysler guidelines concerning management 
personnel, vehicle servicing by authorized dealers, warranty terms, and vehicle alteration. 
Further, Mercedes-Benz USA is required to “actively market” Mercedes-Benz vehicles, display 
signs, maintain an “acceptable” level of working capital, and abide by a number of other 
strictures. Id. 
 22.  Id. at 914. The parties both seemed to concede that Mercedes-Benz USA’s contacts 
with California would be sufficient to subject Mercedes-Benz USA to general jurisdiction there; 
however, at oral argument, the Supreme Court was skeptical as to the sufficiency of the contacts 
and DaimlerChrysler denied it had conceded that issue below. Transcript of Oral Argument at 
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The district court held that DaimlerChrysler’s direct contacts with 
California were insufficient to allow jurisdiction, but inquired whether 
Mercedes-Benz USA’s contacts could be imputed or attributed to 
DaimlerChrysler, its corporate parent. 
In the Ninth Circuit, a subsidiary corporation’s contacts can be 
attributed to a parent when the subsidiary corporation functions as 
the parent corporation’s agent.23 To make this determination the 
district court asks whether the “subsidiary represents the parent 
corporation by performing services ‘sufficiently important to the 
[parent] corporation that if it did not have a representative to 
perform them, the [parent] corporation . . . would undertake to 
perform similar services.’”24 The court found no such representation.25 
The district court held that California could not exercise general 
jurisdiction over DaimlerChrysler.26 
Plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit. The questions on appeal 
were (1) what factual showing was needed to satisfy the agency test, 
and (2) whether the district court had applied this jurisdictional 
agency test correctly. The Ninth Circuit found that DaimlerChrysler’s 
agency relationship with an “at home” United States subsidiary 
subjected it to general jurisdiction in California. 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. Personal Jurisdiction and Due Process 
The doctrine of personal jurisdiction emanates from the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,27 which states that 
“[n]o state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law.”28 California’s long-arm statute allows 
California courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over all defendants 
 
6, DaimlerChrysler v. Bauman, No. 11-965 (U.S. argued Oct. 15, 2013). 
 23.  DaimlerChrysler, 2005 WL 3157472, at *11. 
 24.  Id. (quoting Harris Rutsky & Co. Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Bell & Clements Ltd., 328 F.3d 
1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. at *19. Despite the finding of insufficient contacts, the district court inquired as to 
the reasonableness of California exercising jurisdiction over DaimlerChrysler by analyzing 
seven factors and determined exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable. Id. 
 27.  See, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877) (“Since the adoption of the 
Fourteenth Amendment . . . the validity of such judgments may be directly questioned . . . on 
the ground that proceedings in a court of  justice . . . over [parties] whom that court has no 
jurisdiction do not constitute due process of law.”). 
 28.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. 
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to the extent permitted by the constitutions of California and the 
United States. 29 
The modern regime of personal jurisdiction jurisprudence begins 
with the canonical “minimum contacts” analysis from International 
Shoe v. Washington,30 but has since bifurcated into two related yet 
distinct lines of inquiry: specific and general jurisdiction. When a non-
resident defendant carries on certain activities within the forum state, 
and is sued under a cause of action relating to that activity, the forum 
state tribunal has specific personal jurisdiction over that defendant.31 
Under this doctrine, even “single or occasional acts” may be sufficient 
to render an otherwise out-of-state corporation “answerable in that 
State with respect to those acts, though not with respect to matters 
unrelated to the forum connections.”32 
Beyond specific jurisdiction, a nonresident defendant’s activities 
in the forum state may be so “continuous and systematic” as to 
subject that defendant to general personal jurisdiction.33 Tribunals in a 
forum state having general jurisdiction over a defendant can hear 
“any and all claims against [that defendant],”34 whether arising from 
activity in the forum state or not.35 For an individual defendant, the 
“paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the 
individual’s domicile.”36 In 2012, the Supreme Court noted a 
defendant-corporation’s equivalent forum would be “one in which the 
corporation is fairly regarded as at home”37—often the state of 
incorporation and/or principal place of business.38 
 
 
 
 
 29.  CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 2013). 
 30.  326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
 31.  See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2853 (2011) 
(noting specific jurisdiction obtains when a corporation’s “in-state activity is ‘continuous and 
systematic’ and that activity gave rise to the episode-in-suit” (quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317)). 
 32.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 33.  See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984) 
(“[D]ue process is not offended by a State’s subjecting the corporation to its in personam 
jurisdiction when there are sufficient contacts between the State and the foreign corporation.”). 
 34.  Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851. 
 35.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 7, at 15. 
 36.  Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2853. 
 37.  Id. at 2853–54 (citing Lea Brilmayer et al., A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 
TEX. L. REV. 721, 728 (1988)). 
 38.  Id. at 2854.  
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Though the determination of where a party is “essentially at 
home” for general jurisdiction purposes seems primarily based on 
that party’s formal, legal relationships with the forum—such as 
“domicile” or “incorporation”—any analysis into personal jurisdiction 
must additionally consider contacts with the forum state.39 
Presumably, a party that maintains its domicile in or incorporates 
within a forum state is deemed per se to have sufficient contacts for 
personal jurisdiction. 
Even if a defendant has sufficient contacts with the forum state, 
any exercise of jurisdiction must accord with the “traditional notions 
of fair play and substantial justice.”40 Put another way, exercise of 
jurisdiction must be “reasonable.” In practice, reasonability is 
determined on a case-by-case basis by the evaluation of several 
factors41: (1) the burden on the defendant; (2) the forum state’s 
interests; (3) the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining relief; (4) the 
interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining efficient resolutions; 
(5) and the interest of the several states in furthering certain social 
policies.42 
At first glance, general personal jurisdiction seems 
uncomplicated—defendants are subject to general jurisdiction in their 
home states. The complex nature of corporate relationships, however, 
has made determining the states in which a corporation finds itself at 
home challenging. Can a corporate defendant ever be subject to 
general jurisdiction in a foreign state? The Supreme Court holds yes, 
but only in extremely rare, if not extraordinary, circumstances. 
1. Continuous and Systematic Contacts: The Perkins Threshold 
A tribunal has general adjudicative jurisdiction over a non-
resident defendant only when that defendant performs activities so 
“‘continuous and systematic’ as to render [the defendant] essentially 
at home in the forum state.”43 The Court has provided very little 
guidance to define exactly what continuous and systematic means in 
 
 39.  See Int’l Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (“[D]ue process requires . . . 
[that the defendant] have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit 
does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” (quoting Milliken v. 
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940))). 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987). 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851 (quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317). 
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practice.44 
Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Company45 is the 
“textbook case of general jurisdiction appropriately exercised over a 
foreign corporation that has not consented to suit in the forum.”46 In 
Perkins, the president of a Philippine mining company effectively 
managed the company from his home in Ohio throughout the 
Japanese occupation of the Philippines during World War II.47 The 
president kept files, managed company correspondence, issued 
salaries, maintained bank accounts, held directors meetings, and 
supervised the company’s wartime activities, all from his home in 
Ohio.48 After the war, the company was sued in Ohio for various 
claims arising out of its Philippine operations.49 The Perkins Court 
framed the jurisdiction issue as a question of “general fairness to the 
corporation,” placing the company’s activities in the wider context of 
due process: “Whether due process is satisfied must depend . . . upon 
the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly 
administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process 
clause to insure.”50 
Noting the “continuous and systematic supervision” of the 
company’s wartime interests taking place in Ohio, the Court found it 
was fair for Ohio to exercise personal jurisdiction over the company. 
It appears the Perkins Court took for granted that general 
adjudicative jurisdiction could be proper in fora where a defendant 
has no formal ties such as incorporation or residency. Yet Perkins 
indicates that, absent such formal ties, the quality and nature of a non-
resident’s forum state activities must be of particular depth and 
ubiquity. 
 
 
 44.  Id. at 2854 (“In only two decisions postdating International Shoe . . . has this Court 
considered whether an out-of-state corporate defendant's in-state contacts were sufficiently 
‘continuous and systematic’ to justify the exercise of general jurisdiction over claims unrelated 
to those contacts.”). 
 45.  342 U.S. 437 (1952). 
 46.  Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2856 (quoting Donahue v. Far E. Air Transp. Corp., 652 F.2d 
1032, 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). 
 47.  Perkins, 342 U.S. at 447–48. 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Id. at 438–39.  
 50.  Id. at 447. 
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2. Insufficient Contacts: Regular Business Dealings and “Stream 
of Commerce” 
Regular and purposeful commercial activity within a forum state 
does not satisfy the Perkins “continuous and systematic” threshold. 
Three decades after Perkins, in Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, 
S.A. v. Hall,51 the Court refused to find that a Colombian helicopter 
company was subject to general jurisdiction in Texas based on its 
regular purchase of machines and parts from a Fort Worth company.52 
The Court stated that the Colombian company’s purchases and other 
intermittent relations with Texas did not “constitute the kind of 
continuous and systematic general business contacts the Court found 
to exist in Perkins.”53 
Similarly, in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown,54 
the Court rejected exercise of general personal jurisdiction over three 
of Goodyear USA’s foreign subsidiaries when some of those 
subsidiaries’ tires entered the “stream of commerce” in North 
Carolina.55 Although the unanimous Court noted the flow of a 
manufacturer’s goods in the stream of commerce “may bolster an 
affiliation germane to specific jurisdiction,” it found the stream-of-
commerce showing insufficient to allow exercise of general 
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.56 
Goodyear, decided after the Ninth Circuit disposed of 
DaimlerChrysler v. Bauman, is notable for several other reasons. First, 
it expanded the language in Perkins and Helicopteros, rephrasing the 
 
 51.  466 U.S. 408 (1984). 
 52.  Id. at 418–19. The Court relied as well on Rosenberg Brothers & Co. v. Curtis Brown 
Co., 260 U.S. 516 (1923), for the proposition that purchases and related trips to the forum state 
were insufficient to establish jurisdiction over the defendant. Id. at 417. 
 53.  Id. at 416. 
 54.  131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011). 
 55.  Id.at 2855–58. The “stream of commerce” concept in personal jurisdiction represents 
one of the more contentious areas of personal jurisdiction jurisprudence, though it is generally 
limited to specific personal jurisdiction and products liability cases. The notion is that if one 
places a good in the stream of commerce with the reasonable expectation or hope that it will 
reach the forum state, that party can be considered to have purposefully availed itself of the 
laws of that state, rendering it amenable to suit there. It has rarely, if ever, been invoked for a 
claim of general personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co., v. Superior Court, 480 
U.S. 102, 121 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring) (reasoning that jurisdiction was proper over a 
foreign supplier of component parts to a foreign bicycle manufacturer selling products in the 
forum state because that supplier would benefit from sales in that state); World-Wide 
Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 313–17 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting the fact 
defendants purposefully put an automobile into the stream of commerce where it could 
reasonably be expected to go to Oklahoma could be sufficient to allow suit against it there). 
 56.  Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2855–56. 
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sufficiency of a defendant’s contacts for general jurisdiction as 
“affiliations . . . so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render [the 
defendant] essentially at home in the forum state.”57 Second, the 
plaintiffs in Goodyear claimed that Goodyear USA and all of its 
subsidiaries were a “single enterprise,”58 thus allowing the attribution 
of Goodyear USA’s contacts with the forum state to all of its other 
owned subsidiaries.59 Though the Goodyear Court rejected this theory 
as not preserved, it opined without elaboration that such a theory 
would require the Court to “pierce Goodyear corporate veils, at least 
for jurisdictional purposes.”60 
Simply put, “piercing the corporate veil” means ignoring the 
formal relationship between a parent corporation and its subsidiaries 
that shields one from liability for the other’s activities.61 Thus, in a 
jurisdictional sense, a “single enterprise theory” can pierce the 
corporate veil by holding the parent of a wholly-owned subsidiary 
subject to suit in the forum state based on the subsidiary’s 
relationship with that state, and vice versa. The Court was thus quite 
dismissive of a contemplated attribution of jurisdictional contacts, 
very much akin to the Ninth Circuit’s holding in DaimlerChrysler.62 
None of these cases expressly limit a forum’s exercise of general 
jurisdiction over a corporation solely to the states where it is 
incorporated or where it maintains its principal place of business. The 
contacts analysis required by International Shoe still obtains. The 
benchmark set by Perkins for satisfying the contacts requirement, 
however, is extraordinarily high. 
Justice Brennan, dissenting in Helicopteros, suggested that the 
Due Process Clause might allow a state to exercise general 
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant who did not maintain 
“continuous and systematic” contacts with that state: “Nothing in 
Perkins suggests, however, that such ‘continuous and systematic’ 
contacts are a necessary minimum before a state may constitutionally 
assert general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation.”63 Beyond 
 
 57.  Id. at 2851 (emphasis added). 
 58.  Id. at 2857. 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Id.  
 61.  See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1264 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “piercing the corporate 
veil” as “[t]he judicial act of imposing personal liability on otherwise immune corporate officers, 
directors, or shareholders for the corporations wrongful acts”). 
 62.  See infra notes 90–93 and accompanying text. 
 63.  Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 421 (1984) (Brennan, 
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vague allusions to purposeful availment, however, Justice Brennan did 
not discuss what circumstances would be required to allow a forum 
state to exercise general jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant in 
the absence of Perkins-level contacts.64 
B. General Jurisdiction Analysis and the Circuit Courts 
Guiding Supreme Court precedent allows for few and limited 
circumstances when general jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant 
is proper. And in its modern jurisdiction jurisprudence, the Court has 
never suggested that imputation or attribution of a subsidiary’s 
contacts to a parent corporation is proper. Indeed, only a single 
Supreme Court case decided nine decades ago, Cannon 
Manufacturing Company v. Cudahy Packing Company,65 discussed 
infra, even tangentially addresses whether a corporation can be 
subject to general jurisdiction based on its subsidiary’s contacts. 
Nevertheless, lower federal courts have filled this lack of guiding 
precedent with several tests for finding when a subsidiary’s activity or 
presence (i.e. contacts) in the forum state renders the parent 
“essentially at home” there. 
The circuit courts employ either or both of two tests to decide 
when a subsidiary’s contacts in the forum state can be imputed to the 
parent corporation, thus conferring jurisdiction over the parent. One, 
the alter ego test, is pervasive among the circuits and requires a 
showing that the parent and subsidiary are “not really separate 
entities.”66 The more controversial test, and the one at issue in this 
case, is the so-called agency test. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
J., dissenting). 
 64.  Id. at 420. 
       65.    267 U.S. 333 (1925).  
 66.  See, e.g., Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting the proper inquiries 
in a general jurisdiction case are to find the extent of a subsidiary’s contacts, whether imputation 
to the parent is proper, and whether exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable). Petitioners in this 
case urge the Supreme Court to adopt or at least “bless” the alter ego test as being both 
constitutional and desirable. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 7, at 18.  
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Only the Second and Ninth Circuits employ the agency test.67 
These courts attribute the subsidiary’s contacts to the parent when the 
subsidiary acts as the parent’s “agent.”68 To be an agent for 
jurisdictional purposes, the subsidiary’s services must be “sufficiently 
importan[t]” to the parent corporation “that if it did not have a 
representative to perform them, the [parent] corporation’s own 
officials would undertake to perform substantially similar services.”69 
In addition to the “sufficient importance” prong, the Ninth Circuit 
also requires “an element” of parental control over the subsidiary.70 
The “sufficient importance” standard for finding an agency 
relationship is not found in agency law outside of the personal 
jurisdiction context.71 This standard does not examine whether the 
parent would perform the subsidiary’s activities itself if that particular 
subsidiary disappeared, but rather asks whether the corporation 
would perform the subsidiary’s activity itself if there was no agent 
representative whatsoever to engage in that activity.72 Evidence that 
 
 67.  See, e.g., Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 95 (2d Cir. 2000) (allowing 
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation when its in-state representative entity performs 
sufficiently important services on behalf of the foreign corporation that the corporation would 
perform those services itself if no agent were available); Unocal, 248 F.3d at 928 (noting that to 
satisfy the agency test, a party must demonstrate that “the subsidiary functions as the parent 
corporation's representative in that it performs services that are sufficiently important to the 
foreign corporation that if it did not have a representative to perform them, the corporation's 
own officials would undertake to perform substantially similar services” (citations omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 68.  Unocal, 248 F.3d at 926 (“Nonetheless, if the parent and subsidiary are not really 
separate entities, or one acts as an agent of the other, the local subsidiary's contacts with the 
forum may be imputed to the foreign parent corporation.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 69.  Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 644 F.3d 909, 920 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Unocal, 
248 F.3d at 928), cert. granted sub nom. DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bauman, 133 S. Ct. 1995 (Apr. 
22, 2013). 
 70.  Id. The necessity of a showing of “control” in the Ninth Circuit’s agency test is 
questionable. When Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler first went to the Ninth Circuit, Judge Nelson’s 
now vacated opinion averred that the agency test required a finding of parental control “so 
pervasive and continual that the subsidiary may be considered an agent or instrumentality of the 
parent.” Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 579 F.3d 1088, 1095 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated, 644 
F.3d 909 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. granted sub nom. DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bauman, 133 S. Ct. 1995 
(Apr. 22, 2013). This formulation, especially the “instrumentality” language, seems to conflate 
the agency and alter ego tests. Judge Reinhardt’s dissent in the earlier opinion excoriated the 
majority for making this benchmark showing so high and in the second DaimlerChrysler opinion 
he pares down the required showing to “an element.” DaimlerChrysler, 644 F.3d at 920. 
 71.  DaimlerChrysler, 644 F.3d. at 923. 
 72.  See Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 95 (“[A N.Y. court] may assert jurisdiction over a foreign 
corporation when it affiliates itself with a New York representative entity and that New York 
representative renders services . . . sufficiently important to the foreign entity that the 
corporation itself would perform equivalent services if no agent were available.”). 
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the subsidiary’s activities are sufficiently important to the parent 
corporation can include sales numbers by the subsidiary in the forum 
state,73 or percentage of business conducted by that subsidiary.74 
The Seventh and Eighth Circuits have explicitly rejected the 
agency test for personal jurisdiction and use only the alter ego test.75 
The Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits exclusively employ the alter ego 
test, though they have not explicitly rejected the agency test.76 The 
First and Eleventh Circuits employ a test for attributing contacts they 
call an “agency test” in name, but which actually requires a showing 
that the subsidiary and parent corporations are alter egos.77 
The Supreme Court has never addressed whether an agency 
relationship allows a court to attribute a subsidiary’s contacts to the 
parent for personal jurisdiction purposes. Indeed, although Supreme 
Court dicta implies that an agency relationship may be important in a 
specific jurisdiction inquiry,78 the Perkins threshold for general 
jurisdiction still applies. Justice Ginsburg, although noting that a court 
may have specific jurisdiction over a parent corporation based on a 
subsidiary’s presence, nevertheless asserted: “[A]ll agree [a parent 
corporation] surely is not subject to general (all-purpose) jurisdiction 
in [forum state] courts, for that foreign-country corporation is hardly 
‘at home’ [there].”79 
 
 73.  See DaimlerChrysler, 644 F.3d at 922 (noting that the auto company subsidiary’s 
California sales comprised 2.4 percent of the parent’s worldwide sales). 
 74.  See Chan v. Soc’y Expeditions, Inc., 39 F.3d 1398, 1406 (1994) (refusing to decide 
whether a subsidiary was an agent when the record contained insufficient evidence of the 
percentage of the parent’s business coming from the subsidiary). 
 75.  See Viasystems, Inc. v. EBM-Papst St. Georgen GmbH & Co., KG, 646 F.3d 589, 596 
(8th Cir. 2011) (finding imputation proper only with an alter ego showing); Cent. States, Se. & 
Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Reimer Express World Corp., 230 F.3d 934, 944 (7th Cir. 2000) 
(holding that the use of a subsidiary’s contacts for jurisdiction over a parent violates due 
process).  
 76.  Newport News Holdings Corp. v. Virtual City Vision, Inc., 650 F.3d 423, 433 (4th Cir. 
2011); Estate of Thomson v. Toyota Motor Corp. Worldwide, 545 F.3d 357, 362 (6th Cir. 2008); 
Dalton v. R & W Marine, Inc., 897 F.2d 1359, 1363 (5th Cir. 1990). 
 77.  Consol. Dev. Corp. v. Sherritt, Inc., 216 F.3d 1286, 1293–94 (11th Cir. 2000) (“For 
Consolidated to persuade us that the district court had general personal jurisdiction over 
Viridian because of VFI's activities in the United States, it would have to show that VFI's 
corporate existence was simply a formality, and that it was merely Viridian's agent.”); Miller v. 
Honda Motor Co., 779 F.2d 769, 772 (1st Cir. 1985) (refusing to exercise jurisdiction when 
subsidiary and parent were not, in reality, a single entity).  
 78.  See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 479 n.22 (1985) (“We have 
previously noted that when commercial activities are carried on in behalf of an out-of-state 
party those activities may sometimes be ascribed to the party . . . at least where he is a primary 
participan[t] in the enterprise and has acted purposefully in directing those activities.” (citations 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 79.  J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2797–98 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., 
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In the only case on point, Cannon Manufacturing Co., the Court 
refused to allow a North Carolina court to exercise personal 
jurisdiction over an Alabama parent corporation when the parent 
established a North Carolina subsidiary that it controlled 
“immediately and completely.”80 Noting that both entities observed all 
formal corporate distinctions and remained independent entities,81 the 
Court phrased the question as “simply whether the corporate 
separation carefully maintained must be ignored in determining the 
existence of jurisdiction.”82 The Court held “the corporate separation 
[between the two companies], though perhaps merely formal, was 
real” and refused to consider the parent corporation properly subject 
to personal jurisdiction in North Carolina.83 
Cannon Manufacturing Co. has not been overruled, although its 
holding has not been incorporated into the Supreme Court’s modern, 
contacts-based personal jurisdiction jurisprudence. However, by 
employing the agency and alter ego tests, the lower federal courts 
often ignore formal corporate separation in some general jurisdiction 
inquiries. The Supreme Court’s decision in DaimlerChrysler will 
determine whether this license is warranted. 
IV. NINTH CIRCUIT HOLDING 
A Ninth Circuit panel affirmed the district court order dismissing 
the case for lack of personal jurisdiction.84 Judge Nelson, writing for 
the majority, first rearticulated the Ninth Circuit agency test.85 He 
averred that attribution of a subsidiary’s jurisdictional contacts to its 
corporate parent required, in addition to a finding that the subsidiary 
perform services of “sufficient importance” on behalf of the parent, 
that the parent exercise “pervasive and continual control” over the 
subsidiary.86 Such findings, when the subsidiary corporation’s contacts 
 
dissenting). 
 80.  Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333, 335 (1925). 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Id. at 336. 
 83.  Id. at 336–38.  
 84.  Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 579 F.3d 1088, 1098 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated, 644 
F.3d 909 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. granted sub nom. DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bauman, 133 S. Ct. 1995 
(Apr. 22, 2013). The panel consisted of Judges Schroeder, Nelson, and Reinhardt. Id. at 1099. 
After first affirming the district court with Judge Nelson writing for the majority and Reinhardt 
in dissent, the Ninth Circuit granted rehearing without comment and the same panel issued a 
second opinion, this time with Judge Reinhardt writing for the majority. Bauman v. 
DaimlerChrysler Corp., 676 F.3d 774, 775 (9th Cir. 2011).  
 85.  DaimlerChrysler, 579 F.3d at 1094–95.  
 86.  Id. at 1095–96. 
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make it “essentially at home” in the forum state, would render the 
parent corporation similarly at home there. Objecting to this 
heretofore unnecessary requirement of “pervasive and continual 
control” in the agency test, Judge Reinhardt castigated the majority 
for “formulat[ing] a stringent new test for determining whether an 
agency relationship exists for the purposes of establishing personal 
jurisdiction.”87 
Nine months later, the Ninth Circuit granted the Plaintiffs’ 
petition for rehearing.88 The very same panel then reversed the district 
court and vacated the previous panel opinion.89 On rehearing, the new 
Ninth Circuit panel asked “whether [Mercedes-Benz USA’s] 
extensive contacts with California warrant[s] the exercise of general 
jurisdiction over [DaimlerChrysler].”90 The panel, with Judge 
Reinhardt now writing for the majority, determined that an agency 
relationship existed. The court reasoned that because luxury car sales 
in California accounted for 2.4 percent of DaimlerChrysler’s total 
auto sales, and because nearly 50 percent of all DaimlerChrysler’s 
revenue came from the sales activities of Mercedes-Benz USA, 
Mercedes-Benz USA’s activities were of “sufficient importance” that, 
in the absence of any representative to perform them, 
DaimlerChrysler would perform them itself.91 
The panel then rejected Judge Nelson’s second prong to the 
agency test—requiring a showing of “pervasive and continuous” 
corporate control over the subsidiary—which would have rendered 
the agency test much more akin to the alter ego test. Rather, the panel 
averred that the only showing necessary to satisfy the agency test was 
that the parent has the “right to control” the subsidiary.92 After 
exhaustively reviewing DaimlerChrysler’s distributor agreement with 
Mercedes-Benz USA, the court determined DaimlerChrysler had the 
“right to substantially control” Mercedes-Benz USA’s activities.93 
 
 
 87.  Id. at 1098 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). 
 88.  Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 603 F.3d 1141, 1141 (9th Cir. 2010) (granting 
rehearing and vacating opinion).  
 89.  Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 644 F.3d 909, 931 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. granted sub 
nom. DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bauman, 133 S. Ct. 1995 (Apr. 22, 2013). 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  Id. at 931. 
 92.  DaimlerChrysler, 644 F.3d at 923. 
 93.  Id. 
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DaimlerChrysler’s petition for rehearing en banc was denied.94 
Judge O’Scannlain, joined by eight other judges, wrote a blistering 
dissent to the en banc denial criticizing the Ninth Circuit’s decision as 
“extend[ing] the reach of general personal jurisdiction far beyond its 
breaking point,” and calling its holding “an affront to due process.”95 
Specifically, the dissent attacked the panel’s use of a more lenient 
agency test, with a relaxed “control” requirement, as “ignor[ing] the 
bedrock concerns of fundamental fairness that underpin Supreme 
Court due process jurisprudence.”96 
Judge O’Scannlain further castigated the panel for perpetuating 
the circuit split97 and directly questioned the appropriateness of any 
agency test for personal jurisdiction whatsoever.98 In his view, the 
panel decision rejected “respect for corporate separateness”—a 
fundamental feature of the economic and legal systems.99 Finally, the 
dissent noted several foreign policy implications including the 
possibility of retaliatory jurisdictional laws in Europe impeding 
international agreements.100 
DaimlerChrysler petitioned for and was granted certiorari by the 
Supreme Court.101 
V. ARGUMENTS 
As a personal jurisdiction case, the overarching question before 
the Supreme Court is whether California’s exercise of general 
personal jurisdiction over DaimlerChrysler violates the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, this central question 
can be distilled into a more basic inquiry—whether maintaining a 
wholly-owned and independent subsidiary in the forum state can 
render a foreign parent corporation “essentially at home” in that 
state. 
 
 
 94.  Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 676 F.3d 774, 774 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 95.  Id. at 774–75. (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting). 
 96.  Id. at 776–77.  
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id. at 777–78.  
 99.  Id.  
 100.  Id. at 779. 
 101.  DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bauman, 133 S. Ct. 1995 (2013) (granting certiorari).  
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A. DaimlerChrysler’s Argument 
DaimlerChrysler argues California’s exercise of general personal 
jurisdiction over it, based solely on its relationship with a wholly 
owned subsidiary in California, is contrary to the Court’s precedent 
and a clear violation of the Due Process Clause.102 Though 
DaimlerChrysler’s brief asserts several other grounds for reversal, the 
crux of its argument is a spirited attack on the constitutionality of the 
Ninth Circuit’s agency test.103 
Using Perkins and Goodyear as a baseline, DaimlerChrysler 
trenchantly argues that the contacts, activity, and presence of a 
separate, subsidiary corporation in the forum state in no way renders 
the parent corporation “at home” there. However, rather than argue 
that attribution of a subsidiary corporation’s contacts is never 
appropriate, DaimlerChrysler defends the prevalent alter ego test: 
“Only a showing of an alter-ego relationship is adequate to meet 
these constitutional requirements where an assertion of general 
jurisdiction over a defendant is premised on the attribution of another 
entity’s contacts with the forum.”104 
DaimlerChrysler’s argument in support of the alter ego test as the 
only acceptable means of jurisdictional contact attribution is an 
implied rejection of the agency test. It centers on the necessity of 
preserving the venerable doctrine of corporate separation and 
maintenance of the corporate veil as well as the due process principle 
that jurisdictional rules provide notice and predictability to potential 
defendants.105 Embracing the agency test would essentially destroy the 
doctrine of corporate separateness—that “‘a corporation and its 
stockholders are generally to be treated as separate entities,’ 
regardless of ‘the control which stock ownership gives to the 
stockholders.’”106 This in turn would allow the Court to “pierce the 
corporate veil”—holding stockholders, in this case the parent, 
accountable for the actions of the corporation.107 Maintaining 
 
 102.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 7, at 14.  
 103.  Id. at 17. DaimlerChrysler argues initially that its direct contacts with California are 
wholly insufficient to subject it to general jurisdiction there, though this is uncontested by either 
party. Id. at 14. It also asserts that a California court’s exercise of jurisdiction over 
DaimlerChrysler would be unreasonable when analyzed in terms of the factors enumerated in 
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, but this section focuses only on the agency argument. Id. at 
37–38.  
 104.  Id. at 18. 
 105.  Id. at 27. 
 106.  Id. (quoting United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 61 (1988)). 
 107.  Id. at 19. 
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corporate separateness, thereby protecting stockholders from liability, 
is imperative because such corporate relationships constitute “the 
only possible engine for carrying on international trade on a scale 
commensurate with modern needs and opportunities.”108 
DaimlerChrysler points to Cannon Manufacturing Co. as being 
part of a “long tradition” of honoring the formalities of corporate 
separateness in the personal jurisdiction context.109 In Canon 
Manufacturing Co., the out-of-state parent was not subject to 
jurisdiction in the forum state even though it completely dominated 
the in-state subsidiary’s activities.110 Judicial deference to corporate 
separateness is bolstered by the Supreme Court’s assertion that 
personal jurisdiction inquiries demand the contacts of each party be 
assessed individually.111 
Relying on this tradition, DaimlerChrysler argues, corporations 
have become accustomed to working under the alter ego doctrine.112 
Upholding a test based on that doctrine would thus allow 
corporations to better predict when their activities will expose them 
to suit in a particular state, making corporate business decisions easier 
and facilitating commerce.113 As a means for attributing contacts, the 
alter ego test makes intuitive sense because when two corporations 
are alter egos they are “not really separate entities.”114 Because an 
alter ego finding means that the subsidiary is actually a “mere 
instrumentality” of the parent,115 there is, de facto, no separation 
between the subsidiary and parent. Due process cannot be offended 
by the imputation of subsidiary contacts when those contacts are 
actually those of the parent itself. 
In contrast to the universality of the alter ego test, 
DaimlerChrysler notes the “sufficient importance” showing for 
agency, used only in the personal jurisdiction context and nowhere 
else in agency law,116 is heavily disfavored among the federal circuits.117 
 
 108.  Id. at 18 (citing STEPHEN B. PRESSER, PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL § 1:1 (2012)).  
 109.  Id. at 19. 
 110.  Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333, 336 (1925). See also supra notes 
80–83 and accompanying text. 
 111.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 7, at 20 (citing Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 465 U.S. 
770, 781 n.13 (1984)).  
 112.  Id. at 21. 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Id. at 23 (citing NetJets Aviation, Inc. v. LHC Commc’ns, LLC, 537 F.3d 168, 176 (2d 
Cir. 2008)).  
 116.  Id. at 25. 
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And pointing to the “essentially at home” threshold in Goodyear, 
DaimlerChrysler asserts that any jurisdictional agency test would 
affront due process because no principal-agent relationship would 
“ensure that defendants are subject to general jurisdiction only where 
they—and not just their agents—have sufficient contacts to render 
them ‘at home’ in the forum State.”118 
The policy reasons for abandoning the Ninth Circuit’s test include 
its rejection of the “well-settled requirements for agency,” potentially 
allowing states to catch defendants off-guard and subject them to suit 
without any regard for that defendant’s actual contacts.119 Finally, 
DaimlerChrysler echoes the concerns about foreign policy in Judge 
O’Scannlain’s dissent, including concerns for the chilling effects on 
international trade, and placing the United States’ jurisdictional 
practices out of step with international standards.120 
B. Plaintiff-Respondents’ Argument 
Plaintiffs present a novel and complex argument, essentially 
asking the Court to fundamentally reexamine its general jurisdiction 
jurisprudence. Specifically, Plaintiffs try to reframe the issue as an 
examination of the very outer jurisdictional limits of what the Due 
Process Clause will allow and whether California’s exercise of general 
jurisdiction is beyond those limits. 
Plaintiffs characterize any personal jurisdiction decision (specific 
or general) as requiring three inquiries: (1) what contacts with the 
forum are relevant; (2) are those contacts sufficient for the type of 
jurisdiction asserted; and (3) if sufficient, has the defendant made a 
compelling case that renders jurisdiction unreasonable under the Due 
Process Clause.121 For Plaintiffs, this case concerns only whether the 
California contacts and activities of DaimlerChrysler’s subsidiary, 
Mercedes-Benz USA, are relevant to the jurisdiction inquiry.122 
Plaintiffs first argue that forums where a defendant is subject to 
general jurisdiction are not expressly limited in number by the phrase 
“at home” in Goodyear.123 Second, Plaintiffs dismiss 
 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Id. at 34. 
 120.  Id. at 36. 
 121.  Brief for Respondents at 12–13, DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bauman, No. 11-965 (U.S. 
Aug. 19, 2013), 2013 WL 4495139. 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  See id. at 15 (refuting DaimlerChrysler’s argument that the phrase “at home” refers 
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DaimlerChrysler’s contention that the alter ego test is the only 
acceptable means of attributing a subsidiary’s contacts to its parent. 
Endorsing the alter ego test, they say, is inconsistent with federal 
constitutional law because the rules outlining when two separate 
corporations are really alter egos are almost entirely products of state 
law.124 Rather than providing a desirable predictability in personal 
jurisdiction rules that corporations can use to guide their business 
decisions, endorsing the alter ego test could subject a corporation 
doing business in the United States to fifty different standards. 
Further, state long arm statutes, such as California’s,125 “extend[] . . . 
personal jurisdiction to the fullest extent permitted by the due process 
clause.”126 This “fullest extent” of federal constitutional law cannot be 
set by state-specific standards. Thus, the court should not limit 
constitutional due process by subjecting it to the vagaries of fifty 
different state veil-piercing provisions.127 
Plaintiffs invoke International Shoe, noting that in any exercise of 
jurisdiction, the “ultimate question is whether . . . [the exercise] 
comports with ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice.’”128 The principal consideration is “the degree to which the 
defendant ‘enjoys the benefits and protections of the laws of that 
state’ by virtue of its ‘contacts’ with the forum.”129 A formalistic “alter 
ego” test concentrates only on the relationship between parent and 
subsidiary, not on whether the defendant enjoyed the benefits of the 
forum state’s laws—even if through its agents.130 Rather, courts should 
be allowed to consider the nature of jurisdictional contacts, including 
their potential attribution or imputation to a corporate parent, in each 
personal jurisdiction inquiry. A formality like corporate separateness 
should not foreclose a court’s analysis of minimum contacts.131 
 
 
 
 
only to a limited number of jurisdictions such as incorporation or location of corporate 
headquarters). 
 124.  Id. 
 125.  See supra note 29. 
 126.  Brief for the Respondents, supra note 121, at 20.  
 127.  Id. at 21–22. 
 128.  Id. at 22 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). 
 129.  Id. at 22–23 (quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319). 
 130.  Id. at 23. 
 131.  Id. at 28. 
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Plaintiffs distinguish Cannon Manufacturing Co., noting that the 
Court there claimed no constitutional basis for its refusal to allow 
personal jurisdiction, but rather cited a lack of statutory authority for 
maintaining jurisdiction.132 The alter ego test is not enshrined in 
federal constitutional law and Canon Manufacturing Co. was decided 
well before International Shoe denounced the “strict formalism 
underlying Cannon and similar decisions of its era, in favor of a more 
pragmatic implementation of the Due Process Clause.”133 Finally, any 
decision to endorse the alter ego test as a correct basis for attributing 
jurisdictional contacts is correctly left to Congress—it is not a matter 
of federal constitutional law. 
Supporting the agency test, Plaintiffs claim that nothing in the 
Due Process Clause prohibits a court from considering the contacts of 
a defendant corporation’s subsidiary when that subsidiary undertakes 
important duties and is controlled by the parent.134 Plaintiffs contend 
that courts should be allowed to consider a subsidiary’s contacts in a 
minimum-contacts analysis when “the subsidiary (1) is wholly owned 
by the defendant; (2) undertakes an important part of the defendant’s 
business in the forum; (3) exclusively for the defendant; and (4) does 
so while subject to substantial control by its owner.”135 
VI. ANALYSIS AND LIKELY DISPOSITION 
A. The Attribution of Contacts 
The most compelling question in this case is whether the Due 
Process Clause allows the attribution of Mercedes-Benz USA’s 
contacts to DaimlerChrysler. As noted above, the Supreme Court has 
not authorized any method whatsoever whereby one organization’s 
contacts with a forum can be attributed to another. 
A tribunal with general jurisdiction has enormous power over a 
defendant. That tribunal can hear any suit, arising out of any activity, 
performed anywhere in the world. This enormous grant of power is 
likely why the Supreme Court so steadfastly restricts the exercise of 
general jurisdiction. In the modern business landscape, large 
corporations and their interrelated networks of franchisees, agents, 
and contractors are spread across multiple jurisdictions. This suggests 
 
 132.  Id. at 29. 
 133.  Id. 
 134.  Id. at 36–37. 
 135.  Id. at 38. 
NOELLE 12.5.2013 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/5/2013  5:14 PM 
2013] THE BOUNDS OF GENERAL PERSONAL JURISDICTION 37 
a corporation can be “essentially at home” in places other than its 
formal “residences.” The current paradigm of general and specific 
jurisdiction is neither wholly reflective of nor adequately tailored to 
deal with the nuances of modern corporate relationships. 
The circuit courts, by creating the agency and alter ego tests, 
implicitly acknowledge that some form of jurisdictional contact 
attribution is necessary to manage this corporate landscape. However, 
the two attribution tests at issue here are not equal, and the Court will 
almost assuredly reject the constitutionality of the agency test. 
1. Evaluating the Agency Test 
The Ninth Circuit agency test provides an extraordinarily liberal 
metric for attributing a subsidiary corporation’s contacts to its parent. 
The two-prong test asks first whether the parent corporation would 
take on the activities of the subsidiary if no representative existed to 
perform them. There is almost a presumption of agency in the parent-
subsidiary context; otherwise why does the subsidiary exist? Further, 
it requires hypothetical reasoning to determine what a corporation 
would do in a completely imaginary situation. Judge Reinhardt’s 
reasoning in the Ninth Circuit opinion is illustrative. 
Judge Reinhardt found the 2.4 percent of total sales (through 
Mercedes-Benz USA) in California as “sufficiently important to 
[DaimlerChrysler] that they would almost certainly be performed by 
other means.”136 He cited no evidence for this conclusion. He further 
saw no difference in whether the subsidiary’s activity would likely be 
performed by the company itself, another subsidiary, or a separate 
representative.137 This prong of the agency test becomes such a grant 
of judicial discretion as to be no test at all. 
The additional prong, requiring a showing of “right of control” 
rather than actual control, also provides little if any judicial guidance. 
In this case, Judge Reinhardt, after listing all the instances in which 
DaimlerChrysler had authority over Mercedes-Benz USA, concluded 
DaimlerChrysler had a “right to substantially control” its subsidiary.138 
The nature of corporate subsidiaries, especially wholly-owned 
corporate subsidiaries, will always allow some degree of control. Case 
law has established no clear line at all for determining when 
 
 136.  Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 644 F.3d 909, 922 (9th Cir. 2011) (emphasis added), 
cert. granted sub nom. DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bauman, 133 S. Ct. 1995 (Apr. 22, 2013). 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  Id. at 924. 
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customary contractual provisions go beyond establishing an ordinary 
and unexceptional corporate relationship to creating a right to 
control. 
For Judge Reinhardt, the agency test allows courts to better hold 
corporate entities to account for their misdeeds. Corporations are 
able to benefit tremendously from American markets and evade 
litigation through creative corporate structuring, “den[ying] the 
plaintiffs, out of hand, a judicial forum and the opportunity to seek 
redress of grievous wrongs.”139 The facts in this case underscore the 
inapplicability of Judge Reinhardt’s justifications for the agency test. 
In the first place, California would undoubtedly have specific 
jurisdiction over DaimlerChrysler if the harm in this case were 
committed in California. The idea that DaimlerChrysler’s derivation 
of even enormous benefit from business in California can render it 
amenable to any suit whatsoever in that state goes far beyond the 
bounds of any applicable precedent. Though it might be difficult to 
think a multi-billion dollar corporation is terribly burdened compared 
to the benefits it receives, the practical effect of the agency test would 
be to subject a corporation to suit in an indeterminate number of 
states, based on an arbitrary percentage of sales analysis, subject to a 
haphazard exercise of judicial discretion. 
Because of this essential arbitrariness, corporations would be 
uncertain as to where they are subject to suit, faced with the 
possibility of adjudicating any claim against them in any number of 
fora. Whereas the doctrine of specific jurisdiction allows a corporation 
to anticipate suits in places where it has contacts, general jurisdiction 
would allow the worst form of forum shopping. Corporations may 
decide to exercise less control over and grant more independence to 
their subsidiaries to evade the agency test. This could result in less 
efficient trade and business models. 
Further, the ubiquity of corporate subsidiaries throughout the 
world would turn melting-pot states like California into a forum for 
all the world’s disputes. Perhaps a real palpable interest in seeing 
human rights violations redressed would justify turning America into 
such a forum. However, the judicial resources of the federal courts 
would be severely taxed. Moreover, it would lessen domestic courts’ 
 
 139.  Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 579 F.3d 1088, 1096 (9th Cir. 2009) (Reinhardt, J., 
dissenting), vacated, 644 F.3d 909 (9th Cir. 2011)), cert. granted sub nom. DaimlerChrysler AG 
v. Bauman, 133 S. Ct. 1995 (Apr. 22, 2013). 
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ability to address issues of more tangible import to these fora. The 
agency test, though perhaps a laudable attempt to redress corporate 
wrongs, is an unwieldy tool at best. 
2. Evaluating the Alter Ego test 
The alter ego test, while not precisely at issue in this case, provides 
a more workable, if also flawed, means of attribution. On its face, the 
alter ego test makes more intuitive sense because an alter ego finding 
is akin to finding the parent and subsidiary are the same entity.140 The 
contacts of one are per se the contacts of the other—and if the 
subsidiary is at home in a forum then the parent must also be 
essentially at home in the forum. Thus, as a practical matter, it is less 
likely to offend due process than the agency test. 
The concept of the alter ego is generally known to corporate 
entities and allows them more predictive ability to know where they 
will be haled into court. However, as Plaintiffs note, the specific tests 
for finding alter egos have their genesis in state corporate law.141 The 
Supreme Court, should it embrace the alter ego test, would be in the 
position either of effectively creating a wholly new and original 
standard for alter egos that applies only in the personal jurisdiction 
context, or admitting that what is allowed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process Clause is ultimately a matter for individual 
state law.142 
Although the alter ego test seems a workable answer to the 
problem of attribution, the quandary facing the Court if it adopts the 
alter ego test underscores the inadequacy of its prior jurisprudence. 
Unquestionably some attribution mechanism is needed, but neither 
test simultaneously accords with both its general and specific 
jurisdiction precedents, or strikes an adequate balance between the 
burdens on corporate clients and the interests of the several states. 
 
 
 140.  See, e.g., Sys. Div., Inc. v. Teknek Electronics, Ltd., 253 Fed.Appx. 31, 37 (Fed. Cir. 
2007) (“The exercise of jurisdiction over an alter ego is compatible with due process because a 
corporation and its alter ego are the same entity—thus, the jurisdictional contacts of one are the 
jurisdictional contacts of the other for purposes of the International Shoe due process 
analysis.”). 
 141.  Brief for Respondents, supra note 121, at 20.  
 142.  Id. 
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B. The Court’s Likely Disposition 
On the facts, this is an easy case for the Court. Unless the Court 
decides to expand its general jurisdiction jurisprudence far beyond 
where it currently stands, the Court will almost certainly reverse.143 
Goodyear was likewise an easy case in light of Perkins and 
Helicopteros. Yet the Goodyear Court took that opportunity to 
bolster the “continuous and systematic” language in Perkins with the 
phrase “essentially at home” as the necessary predicate for the 
exercise of general jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit decided this case 
before Goodyear. And it would be an extraordinary step to say the 
presence and activity of a wholly owned subsidiary providing 2.4 
percent of total sales in California renders DaimlerChrysler 
“essentially at home” there. 
Moreover, the policy implications are also particularly persuasive, 
in part because they are generally supported by the United States as 
amicus curiae. Specifically, the United States’ statement of interest in 
the case points to the need for jurisdictional consequences of 
economic activity to be predictable,144 the deleterious effect such 
expansive jurisdictional rules have had on international agreements 
and reciprocal enforcement of judgments,145 and the political 
branches’ interest in seeing American international interests 
protected.146 
Several members of the court have expressed particular concern 
that foreign corporations could hide behind domestic distributors to 
avoid liability for damages they cause.147 However, even those 
 
 143.  There are two other plausible possibilities for disposition. First, the court could decide 
that Mercedes-Benz USA’s contacts with California in no way render it “at home” there, thus 
even the attribution of its contacts to DaimlerChrysler would be unavailing, requiring dismissal 
as improvidently granted. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 22, at 55. Second, this case 
arose under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) and the Torture Victims Protection Act (TVPA); the 
Court recently determined that the ATS does not apply to activities overseas, and the TVPA 
does not apply to organizations. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 
(2013) (“We therefore conclude that the presumption against extraterritoriality applies to 
claims under the ATS, and that nothing in the statute rebuts that presumption.”); Mohamad v. 
Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702, 1710 (2012) (“The text of the TVPA convinces us that 
Congress did not extend liability to organizations, sovereign or not.”). Thus, it is unclear 
whether Plaintiffs have a cognizable claim and the Court may remand to determine this, or 
dismiss. 
 144.  Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 2, 
DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bauman, No. 11-965 (U.S. July 5, 2013), 2013 WL 3377321. 
 145.  Id. at 2–3. 
 146.  Id. 
 147.  J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2794–95 (2011).  
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concerned members have explicitly acknowledged that, despite a 
parent’s use of a domestic distributor, that parent was “hardly at 
home” in the forum state.148 
Though the Plaintiffs present a creative argument for why the 
agency test is theoretically allowed by the Due Process Clause, they 
do not succeed in bringing it in line with the Supreme Court’s other 
general jurisdiction cases. In asking the court to essentially go back to 
the drawing board and ignore the specific showings required by 
general personal jurisdiction, Plaintiffs simply ask too much. 
More curious is whether the Court will decide to adopt the alter 
ego test, or wait for a day when an application of the test is more 
directly before the court. In all probability, the question of whether 
attributing the contacts of a subsidiary corporation to its parent on a 
showing of alter egos offends due process will wait for another day. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
DaimlerChrysler  represents a singular opportunity for the Court 
to either solidify or completely reformulate a major jurisprudential 
problem. In the end, the court is more likely to be persuaded by the 
more staid, precedent-based argument of DaimlerChrysler and 
reverse the Ninth Circuit to hold that exercise of general jurisdiction 
over a foreign corporation cannot be predicated on an agency 
relationship with an in-state subsidiary. Plaintiffs, however, present a 
nuanced argument that exposes some important inconsistencies in 
current doctrine and suggests that the outer limits of what due 
process allows in personal jurisdiction are far wider than heretofore 
tested. Though creative, this argument is likely unpersuasive to a 
Court that has been steadfastly united in its recent general 
jurisdiction decisions.149 Despite this steadfastness, DaimlerChrysler 
shows how even a seemingly settled area of personal jurisdiction 
doctrine is rife with inconsistency and contradiction, and in desperate 
need of Supreme Court guidance. Though it may not in this case, the 
Court should seek an opportunity to redefine jurisdiction to match 
the modern business landscape. 
 
 148.  Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 149.  See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2854 (2011) 
(rejecting the exercise of general jurisdiction in a unanimous opinion).  
 
